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NOTES
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL:
DUE PROCESS PREVAILS IN EVITTS v. LUCEY
The right to effective assistance of counsel is a cornerstone of the American
criminal justice system. A criminal defendant's counsel can help maintain
the due process and other functions of the court through zealous advocacy
of the defendant's cause. State and federal courts have established rules of
evidence and procedure to insure that criminal verdicts are based on relevant
and reliable evidence, to prevent unfair surprise, to provide uniformity of
judgments, and to foster efficiency. To effect the policies underlying these
rules, however, an accused must be assisted by competent counsel.' Repre-
sentation by incompetent counsel inflicts damage not only to an individual
accused's cause, but also to the courts themselves. The long term danger of
incompetent representation is that the public will lose confidence in a system
of justice that it already perceives to be dependent more upon gamesmanship
than equity.2
To protect against improper convictions, the due process clause requires
that state and federal courts provide criminal defendants with effective
assistance of counsel at trial.' The evolution of the criminal appellant's right
I. Commenting on the quality of counsel, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger stated: "Many
judges in general jurisdiction trial courts have stated to me that fewer than 25 percent of the
lawyers appearing before them are genuinely qualified; other judges go as high as 75 percent."
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates
Essential to Our System of Justice? 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 234 (1973).
In 1977, the Federal Judicial Center sent questionaires to all 476 federal district judges asking:
"Do you believe that there is, overall, a serious problem of inadequate trial advocacy by lawyers
with cases in your court?" Out of 366 responses, 41 % answered "yes" and 51 % answered
"no". Additionally, judges rated 8.6 % of the lawyers covered by the survey as less than
adequate. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 633, 634 n.7 (1980) (citing A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERMANT, THE QUALITY OF ADVOCACY
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 30-43 (1978)).
In a survey conducted by the American Bar Foundation in 1975, 1422 state and federal
judges who responded found that 13076 of the individual trial performances rated less than
minimally competent. Schwarzer, supra, at 634 n.7 (citing Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence:
The Judicial Perspective, AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 105, 118 (1978)).
2. Chief Justice Burger has repeatedly lamented the "low state of American trial advocacy
and a consequent diminution in the quality of our entire system of justice." Burger, supra note
I, at 230.
3. The standard of effective assistance of counsel was defined by one court as that level
of performance "which meets a minimum standard of professional representation." United
States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975). But see United States v.
Weston, 708 F.2d 302, 306 (7th Cir. 1983) ("a 'minimum standard of professional representation'
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to counsel on appeal, by contrast, does not clearly derive from the due
process clause. Because the due process clause does not require states to
provide criminal appeals, 4 the United States Supreme Court has developed
a right to counsel on appeal based on both the equal protection and due
process clauses. Until recently, however, the Court never explicitly based the
right to appeal on either clause.' To eliminate this long-standing ambiguity,
the Supreme Court determined in Evitts v. Lucey6 that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment alone supports a criminal appellant's right to
effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal of right.7 This Note briefly
surveys the historical development of the right to counsel, analyzes the
Court's opinion in Lucey, and discusses the implications of the Lucey decision
for future adjudication.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In colonial England, a defendant charged with a felony was denied any
assistance of counsel.' The inclusion of an "assistance of counsel" provision
in the sixth amendment 9 of the United States Constitution evidences the
framer's rejection of the English tradition.'0 In the first one hundred and fifty
guarantees the defendant reasonably effective counsel, not errorless counsel"). See also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983) ("Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation").
4. In McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894), the Supreme Court held that a state need
not provide a system of appellate review. McKane has never been overruled. See also Case
Comment, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 751, 756 (1975) (Court in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1956) may have relied on equal protection, because due process had not been held to command
criminal appellate review).
5. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
6. 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985).
7. Id. at 836-37.
8. F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 109 (1969). England permitted a prisoner to be
represented by counsel only in misdemeaner and treason cases. Id. Not until 1836 did England
permit a charged felon the assistance of counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
10. F. HELLER, supra note 8, at 109-10. The rejection of the English rule that prohibited
felons from receiving representation by counsel grew out of existing differences in the procedural
law of England and the Colonies. In England, criminal defendants were confronted by the
person injured or by some other interested party. In contrast, the Colonies employed full time
criminal prosecutors. Application of the English rule in the Colonies, therefore, was more
inequitable than in England. Id. See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306 (1973) (sixth
amendment right to counsel ratified to reject English common law rule); Powell v. Alabama,
[Vol. 35:185
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years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, however, it was believed that
the sixth amendment did not require the government to provide counsel for
indigent criminal defendants." Courts treated the assistance of counsel pro-
vision as a declaration of the accused's right to have counsel, and not as a
duty on the part of the United States to provide it.2
As applied to state courts, the trial level right to counsel emanates from
the due process clause of the follrteenth amendment. In Powell v. Alabama,"
a 1932 case, the Supreme Court determined that criminal defendants have a
right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Powell Court held that
defendants in a capital case were denied due process when a state refused
them the aid of counsel at trial.' 4 The Court also concluded that, in some
cases, defendants had a right to appointed counsel to protect their right to
a fair hearing. The Court stated that the states' duty to provide counsel "is
not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances
as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the
case." 
5
After Powell, the right to the effective assistance of counsel at the state
trial level became embroiled in the fourteenth amendment incorporation
controversy.' 6 The Supreme Court found that the sixth amendment right to
counsel was a fundamental due process right under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 7 On the other hand, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach in
right to counsel cases and reversed convictions only when the absence of
287 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1932) (in all but one of the colonies, English common law rule that barred
accused felons from receiving assistance of counsel had been rejected).
I1. After the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Congress passed the Federal Crimes Act of
1790, which required that counsel be appointed to defendants in capital cases where defendants
could not afford to retain their own. The Federal Crimes Act would not have been necessary
if the sixth amendment had already guaranteed such a right. F. HELLER, supra note 8, at 110.
12. See, e.g., Nabb v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 173 (1864) (government not liable for fees
of counsel assigned by United States to defend criminal defendant).
13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Id. at 71.
15. Id.
16. For a discussion of the incorporation controversy, see generally G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-88 (10th ed. 1980). The incorporation controversy
focuses on the extent to which the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights are made
applicable to the individual states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The debate in the Court from the 1930's to the 1960's was between advocates of the total and
selective incorporation theories. Id. Total incorporationists claimed that the original purpose
of the fourteenth amendment was to make the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
Proponents of the selective incorporation theory believe that only those Bill of Rights provisions
fundamental to liberty or justice are applicable to the states through the due process clause.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1937).
17. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936) (Powell Court
concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by first eight amendments against federal
action, also applied against states); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940) (in a
capital case, Powell required state to provide counsel).
1985]
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counsel actually deprived a criminal defendant of a fair trial.' 8 Meanwhile,
in a 1938 case, Johnson v. Zerbst, 9 the Court held that in federal court,
"the Sixth Amendment withholds . . . in all criminal proceedings, the power
and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or
waives the assistance of counsel." '20
The controversy over the meaning of Powell was resolved in Gideon v.
Wainwright. 2' In Gideon, the Supreme Court held that the trial level right
to counsel requires that states provide counsel in all cases in which accused
felons cannot afford to retain attorneys to represent them. 22 In Gideon, a
Florida state court denied an indigent criminal defendant who was charged
with a noncapital felony the assistance of counsel at trial, because Florida
law required the appointment of counsel only in capital cases. 21 On appeal,
the Supreme Court interpreted Powell as "unequivocally declar[ing] that the
right to the aid of counsel [at trial] is of [a] fundamental character." '2 4 As
a result, the Court set aside the defendant's state conviction, holding that a
criminal defendant "who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 5
1.8. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Betts, the Court held that the refusal to
appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 473. The Court stated that the "[asserted
denial [of due process) is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.
That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations,
fall short of such denial." Id. at 462. The Bells decision was later overruled in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)
(Powell decision "turned upon the fact that in the particular situation laid before [the Court]
... the benefit of counsel was essential to the substance of a hearing").
19. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
20. Id. at 463.
21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. Id. at 342-44.
23. Id. at 337. In a development related to the quality of counsel on appeal, the Court
decided in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), that all defendants, whether represented by
appointed or privately retained counsel, have a sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. Courts formerly found a basis in the state action requirerpent of the fourteenth
amendment for a less stringent standard of review of the quality of assistance of retained
counsel. The state action requirement was construed by the courts to impose a duty on the
state to ensure the quality of state-employed, appointed counsel. At the same time, the courts
disaffirmed any duty to review the conduct of privately retained counsel, outside of grievous
misconduct that must have been obvious to the forum (the "farce or sham" standard). The
Cuyler Court rejected this distinction. It found that defendants with retained counsel are often
uninformed about legal matters, and cannot usually make independent judgments about the
quality of representation provided by their lawyers. Such defendants, the Court concluded,
depend on the courts to protect their right to representation. Id. at 342-45.
24. Id. at 342-43.
25. Id. at 344. The trial level right to counsel established in Gideon has been extended to
misdemeanants whom the state intends to incarcerate. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
37 (1972), the Court stated: "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial." See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (central
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Although a criminal defendant's right to counsel at trial emanates from
the due process clause, the court has been more equivocal about the source
of the criminal defendant's right to counsel on a first appeal of right. The
Supreme Court first addressed the rights of indigent criminal appellants in
Griffin v. Illinois,26 which was decided in 1956. In Griffin, two indigent
criminal defendants claimed that a trial court violated their rights to equal
protection and due process when it did not provide a transcript for them to
use on appeal.27 The Court concluded that the defendants' constitutional
rights had been denied, but it relied on both the equal protection and due
process clauses as its rules of decision.
The Court also addressed the criminal appellant's right to counsel in
Douglas v. California.2" In Douglas, two indigent criminal defendants re-
quested the assistance of counsel for their first appeals of right. The Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeals denied the defendants' request, concluding
that " 'no good whatsoever could be served by appointment of counsel.' "29
The Supreme Court reversed the California court, and found that criminal
defendants have a right to counsel on appeals of right. The Court, however,
again relied on both equal protection and due process as bases for the right.
According to the Court, the equal protection clause forbids the use of a
wealth-based standard-measured by the ability of a criminal defendant to
afford counsel-to limit access to appeals.3 0 The Court also observed that,
under the due process clause, the defendant's statutory right to appeal was
unconstitutionally terminated without hearing by California's practice of not
appointing counsel to defendants whose appeals were perceived as frivolous."
Thus, while the Douglas court found the existence of a criminal appellant's
right to counsel, they did not explicitly set forth the constitutional basis of
that right.
premise of Argersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or
mere threat of imprisonment-warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as standard for
constitutional right to appointment of counsel).
The trial level right to counsel has also been extended to cases in which a litigant may be
imprisoned. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); see also In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment requires that child
have right to appointed counsel in proceedings to determine delinquency, if decision may result
in incarceration). But see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973) (no per se rule requiring
counsel at probation revocation hearings because when one has been convicted of a crime a
more limited due process right is involved). A right to counsel can also be created by statute.
See Baldwin v. Benson, 584 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1978) (federal Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(B) (1982), was intended "to provide counsel in all
revocation proceedings unless the parolee waived such right").
26. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
27. Id. at 14-15.
28. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
29. Id. at 355 (quoting People v. Douglas, 187 Cal. App. 2d 802, 812, 10 Cal. Rptr. 188,
195 (1960)).
30. Id. at 356-57.
31. Id. at 357-58.
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The Court also addressed the conduct of appellate counsel in Anders v.
California, 2 Entsminger v. Iowa," and Jones v. Barnes. 34 In Anders, the
court-appointed attorney for a criminal appellant refused to proceed with
the appeal because he found it meritless. Instead, the attorney filed a no-
merit letter with the California Court of Appeals.35 The Supreme Court held
that if a court-appointed attorney determines, after a conscientious exami-
nation of the record, that the client's appeal is wholly frivolous, the attorney
should advise the court and request permission to withdraw. 6 In Entsminger,
the Court held that the attorney's failure to notify the defendant of the
decision not to perfect a full appeal deprived the defendant of an adequate
and effective appeal." Finally, in Jones, the Court held that an indigent
defendant does not have a constitutional right to have appointed counsel
press particular non-frivolous points on appeal, if the appellant's counsel
decides as a matter of professional judgment not to present those points."
Thus, prior to Lucey, criminal defendants had already been granted the
32. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
33. 386 U.S. 748 (1967).
34. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
35. 386 U.S. at 742-43.
36. The lawyer's request to withdraw, however, must be accompanied by a brief referring
to anything that might arguably support the general appeal. The Court determined that only
in this manner would a lawyer's duty to act as an active advocate on behalf of the client be
fulfilled. Id. at 744.
37. 386 U.S. at 753. Entsminger involved a convicted defendant who asked his appointed
attorney to perfect a plenary appeal that involved a complete trial court record, briefs, and
argument by counsel. Counsel, believing that the appeal was without merit, did not file the
entire trial court record, thereby limiting the appeal to a modified transcript of the lower court
proceedings. Iowa law provides alternate methods for appealing criminal convictions. One
method is an appeal based on a modified transcript prepared by the trial court clerk as a matter
of course after a notice of appeal is filed. This modified transcript contains only the information
or indictment, the grand jury minutes, the bailiff's oath statement and intructions, and the trial
court's order and judgment entries. It contains neither a transcript of the evidence nor the
briefs and arguments of counsel. In contrast, the second method, which is available on request,
involves the entire trial court record briefs and oral argument. Id. at 749-50.
38. 463 U.S. at 747. In Jones, the defendant, Barnes, advised his appellate counsel by letter
of the arguments he wanted made on appeal, "including specifically that identification testimony
should have been suppressed because it was a product of an unconstitutional pretrial show-up,
that the Assistant District Attorney's cross-examination . . . exceeded permissible legal limits,
that the trial court improperly excluded the psychiatric evidence, and that [he] had been denied
effective assistance of trial counsel." Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir. 1981).
In his brief and oral argument Barnes' appellate counsel argued the "improper exclusion of
psychiatric evidence, failure to suppress Butts' identification testimony and improper cross-
examination of [Barnes] by the trial judge." 463 U.S. at 748. Barnes' appointed counsel,
however, failed to argue most of the defendant's suggested claims in either his brief or oral
argument. The defendant challenged his conviction charging that he had been denied effective
assistance of counsel. Id. The Jones Court found that counsel's emphasis on the stronger legal
arguments did not render his assistance ineffective. Id. at 751. The Court stated further that
"[flor judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed
counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very
goal of vigorous and effective advocacy that underlies Anders. " Id. at 754.
[Vol. 35:185
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right to counsel for a first appeal of right. 9 The prior cases instructed
appointed counsel regarding the rudiments of professional conduct: appellate
counsel must advocate their client's interests zealously and must observe
basic appellate rules. In addition, the Jones Court concluded that decisions
that involve an attorney's professional judgment would be given deference
by the reviewing court. ° In all of these cases, the Court failed to state
whether a criminal appellant's right to counsel is based on due process, equal
protection, or both. In Lucey, the Court finally held that due process requires
that a criminal defendant receive effective assistance of counsel on a first
appeal of right."
EVITTS V. LUCEY
Procedural Background
On March 21, 1976, a Kentucky jury convicted Keith E. Lucey of two
counts of trafficking in. controlled substances.42 He was sentenced to con-
current prison terms of five and ten years. 43 Lucey's retained counsel sub-
sequently filed a timely notice of appeal, 44 a trial court record, and a brief
with the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed Lucey's
appeal, however, because the retained counsel failed to file a statement of
appeal as required under Kentucky's rules of appellate procedure.4" Lucey's
39. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 38.
41. 105 S. Ct. at 836.
42. Id. at 832.
43. Lucey y. Kavanaugh, 724 F.2d 560, 561 (6th Cir. 1984).
44. The Kentucky Constitution states that "[iln all cases civil and criminal, there shall be
allowed as a matter of right at least one appeal to another court. Ky. CONST. art. 6, §
115.
45. Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.095(a)(1) required that the pleading in the
Court of Appeals contain the same information as required in a statement of appeal in the
Kentucky Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 1.090.
Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.090 provides:
In all cases the appellant shall file with the record on appeal a statement setting
forth:
(a) The name of each appellant and each appellee ....
(b) The name and address of counsel for each appellant and appellee.
(c) The name and address of the trial judge.
(d) The date the judgment appealed from was entered, and the page of the record
on appeal on which it may be found ....
(e) The date the notice of appeal was filed and the page of the record on appeal on
which it may be found.
(f) Such of the following facts, if any, as are true:
(I) a notice of cross appeal has been filed;
(2) a supersedeas bond has been executed;
(3) any reason the appeal should be advanced;
(4) this is a suit involving multiple claims and judgment has been made final
19851
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counsel moved for reconsideration, arguing that all the information required
in a statement of appeal was contained in his briefs.46 At the same time,
Lucey's counsel filed a statement of appeal that formally complied with
Kentucky's rules of appellate procedure. 47 After the court of appeals denied
Lucey's motion for reconsideration, Lucey sought discretionary review in
the Kentucky Supreme Court; the supreme court affirmed the appellate court
in a one sentence order.4 8 In a final effort to gain state review of his
conviction, Lucey moved the trial court to vacate his original conviction or
to grant him a belated appeal. 49 The trial court denied this motion.5 0
After Lucey exhausted all of the state avenues for review, he filed for
federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky. Lucey argued that the dismissal of his state
appeal deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal,
as established under the fourteenth amendment due process clause.' The
district court adopted a magistrate's factual determination that Lucey had
been denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Thereupon, the court
issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus52 that ordered the state of Kentucky
to release Lucey and to either reinstate his appeal or to retry him."
The state of Kentucky appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the dismissal of Lucey's appeal violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5 On remand, the parties
stipulated that there was no equal protection issue. The sole issue, therefore,
(5) there is another appeal pending in a case which involves the same transaction
or occurrence, or a common question of law or fact, with which this appeal
should be consolidated, given the style of the other case; and
(6) . . . the appellant is free on bond ....
Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 832. The current formulation of rule 1.090 is Ky. R. Ctv P. 76.06.
46. 105 S. Ct. at 832.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 833.
49. If the defendant can prove on a post-conviction motion that his appellate counsel was
ineffective, the Kentucky Supreme Court allows the trial court to vacate the judgment and
enter a new one upon which appeal can be taken. Stahl v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 617,
618 (Ky. 1981).
50. 105 S. Ct. at 833.
51. Id.
52. Lucey v. Kavanaugh, 724 F.2d 560, 561 (6th Cir. 1984).
53. 105 S. Ct. at 833. "The District Court also referred petitioner's counsel to the Board
of Governors of the Kentucky State Bar Association for disciplinary proceedings for attacking
his own work product." Id. at 833 n.3.
54. Id. at 833.
55. Lucey v. Kavanaugh, 724 F.2d 560, 561-62 (6th Cir. 1984). Apparently, Lucey stipulated
that equal protection was not involved because his attorney on appeal had been retained, and
not appointed. 105 S. Ct. at 834 n.5. Thus, Lucey could not claim membership in a class
comprised of indigents being discriminated against. But see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(J980) (constitutional standard for effective assistance of counsel the same for retained and
appointed counsel).
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was whether due process required that a criminal defendant receive effective
assistance of counsel for a first appeal of right.16 In an unreported decision,
the district court reissued the conditional writ of habeas corpus.57 The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and recognized
the existence of a due process right to the effective assistance of counsel on
appeal. 8 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted Kentucky's
petition for certiorari. 9
MAJORITY's HOLDING
Before the Supreme Court, the state first argued that states have no due
process obligation to offer criminal appeals,' and that the due process clause
therefore does not govern court procedures at the appellate level. 6 1 The state
consequently argued that Lucey did not have a due process right to challenge
his conviction based on his attorney's incompetence at the appellate level.
62
The state also argued that even if the due process clause applied to state
appellate courts, due process did not require the state to guarantee a criminal
56. 105 S. Ct. at 833.
57. Lucey v. Kavanaugh, 724 F.2d 560, 562 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Gilbert v. Sowders,
646 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1981) (failure of retained appellate counsel to file a record on
appeal denied defendant due process); Cleaver v. Bordenkircher, 634 F.2d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir.
1980) (court uses equal protection analysis to find that appointment of overworked counsel
deprived defendant of right to effective assistance of counsel); Boyd v. Cowan, 519 F.2d 182,
183 (6th Cir. 1975) (appellant was denied due process because retained counsel failed to give
timely notice that he did not intend to file or process appellant's appeal); Woodall v. Neil, 444
F.2d 92, 93 (6th Cir. 1971) (petitioner's allegation that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel when his retained counsel failed to perfect a requested appeal requires a hearing at the
district court level).
58. Lucey v. Kavanaugh, 724 F.2d 560, 522 (6th Cir. 1984).
59. Kavanaugh v. Lucey, 104 S. Ct. 2149 (1984). Five days before oral arguments, Kentucky
informed the Supreme Court that Lucey had been released from custody and that his civil
rights, including suffrage and the right to hold public office, were restored as of May 10, 1983.
The Court determined that the case was not moot because some of the collateral consequences
of the conviction remained. The conviction could still be used to impeach any future testimony
Lucey might give, and it could subject Lucey to persistent felony offender prosecution if he
should be tried on any other felony charges in the future. 105 S. Ct. at 833 n.4.
60. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) ("lilt is wholly within the discretion
of the State to allow or not to allow . . . [an appellate] review"). Contrast Justice Brennan's
view as expressed in a footnote in his dissent in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983):
1 ... have little doubt that we would decide that a State must afford at least some
opportunity for review of convictions, 'whether through the familiar mechanism of
appeal or through some form of collateral proceeding. There are few, if any
situations in our system of justice in which a single judge is given unreviewable
discretion over matters concerning a person's liberty or property, and the reversal
rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts, while not
overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their
right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction.
Id. at 756 n.l (Brennan J., dissenting).
61. 105 S. Ct. at 838.
62. Id.
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appellant the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 6 The state
contended that the Griffin-Douglas line of cases were based solely upon
equal protection. Therefore, since the due process clause permits a state to
dismiss an appeal if a defendant has no counsel at all, the due process clause
also permits the state to dismiss an appeal that is brought by an incompetent
attorney. '
The Supreme Court held that due process requires that a criminal appellant
on a first appeal of right be given the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. 65 In the majority opinion, in which seven Justices concurred, the
Court observed that the "right to appeal would be unique among state
actions if it could be withdrawn without consideration of applicable due
process norms. ' ' 66 The Court repeated from its earlier opinions the obser-
vation that a state court must observe due process when it hears a criminal
appeal,6 7 just as it must comport with constitutional due process requirements
when it withholds welfare entitlements6 or makes parole decisions. 69 The
Court concluded that "when a state opts to act in a field where its action
has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with
. . . the Due Process Clause." ''
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found two distinct lines of cases
that were dispositive of the due process issue in Lucey. 7I The first line was
the Griffin-Douglas cases, which involved a criminal defendant's rights on
a first appeal of right. 7 The second line was those cases which recognized
that the trial level right to counsel incorporated the right to effective assist-
ance of counsel. 71 While the Court agreed with the State of Kentucky that
Griffin and Douglas involved equal protection concerns, the Court also
63. Id. at 839.
64. Id. at 839-40.
65. Id. at 836.
66. Id. at 838.
67. Id. at 838-39. There are many other areas in which the due process clause limits state
power to terminate state-granted rights. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (high school
students threatened with brief disciplinary suspensions have right to hearing); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (non-tenured teacher at state college protected against termination,
without notice and hearing, when school's practice was to grant automatic renewal of employ-
ment at end of each term); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (state procedure that
revoked, without hearing, licenses of uninsured drivers who had not paid state bond violates
due process); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (disqualification of unem-
ployment compensation violates freedom of religion under the first amendment).
68. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires an adequate hearing before
a state can terminate public assistance payments to a particular recipient. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
69. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parolee's "liberty is valuable and
must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment").
70. 105 S. Ct. at 839.
71. Id. at 836.
72. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:185
EVITTS V. LUCEY
found that those cases were also based on due process considerations.74 Due
process was implicated in each case because the states' appellate courts did
not offer criminal defendants a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication
on the merits of their appeals. 7 The Court therefore found that the due
process clause separately supported the scope and extent of a criminal
defendant's right to counsel on a first appeal of right. 76
Second, the Lucey Court relied upon the line of cases that apply the sixth
amendment right to counsel to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment." Because trial and appellate counsel employ
similar skills, the Court found that the existence of a right to effective trial
level counsel was partly dispositive of the existence of a right to appellate
level counsel. To prosecute an appeal, a lawyer needs a significant degree
of familiarity with intricate and complex legal and procedural rules, similar
to an attorney at trial. Thus, the Court concluded that unrepresented ap-
pellants, like unrepresented defendants at trial, are unable to protect their
vital interests.78 Although the Court found that Lucey had nominal repre-
sentation on appeal, the Court determined that "nominal representation on
an appeal as of right-like nominal representation at trial-does not suffice
to render the proceedings constitutionally adequate.
7
THE DISSENT
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist each wrote dissenting opinions.
Justice Rehnquist, in whose opinion Chief Justice Burger joined, found that
the two lines of cases relied upon by the majority did not substantiate the
Court's due process analysis.8" Justice Rehnquist disagreed first with the
majority's reading of the Griffin-Douglas line of cases. Rehnquist reasoned
that the Griffin and Douglas decisions, because they dealt only with equal
protection concerns, did not support the majority's due process analysis in
Lucey.
8 1
Justice Rehnquist also distinguished the roles of counsel at trial and on
appeal.82 Justice Rehnquist noted that at the trial level the defendant needs
74. 105IS. Ct. at 840.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 841.
77. Id. at 836. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
78. 105 S. Ct. at 840.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 841 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority created
"virtually out of whole cloth a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to effective assistance
of counsel on the appeal of a criminal conviction." Id.
81. Id. at 842 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist indicated that these cases have
"not imposed any procedural requirements on state appeals other than to bar procedures that
operate to accord indigents a narrower scope of appellate review than nonindigents." Id. at
841-842. Thus, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the cases cited by the majority reveal a
"uniform reliance on equal protection concepts and not due process." Id. at 842.
82. Id. at 843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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effective assistance of counsel as a "shield to protect him against being
'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of inno-
cence. '"" Justice Rehnquist argued that a criminal appellant, in contrast to
a criminal defendant, has already been found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt and is "subject to the immediate deprivation of his liberty without
any constitutional requirement of further proceedings. 8 4 Justice Rehnquist
concluded that a criminal appellant "seeks 'to upset the prior determination
of guilt' and [can] . . . retain an attorney to serve 'as a sword' in that
endeavor." 5 In this vein, Chief Justice Burger observed in his separate
dissenting opinion that, "few things have plagued the administration of
criminal justice, or contributed more to the lowered public confidence in the
courts, than the interminable appeals, the retrials, and the lack of finality. '8 6
Justice Rehnquist also argued that, because the due process clause does
not guarantee a right to a criminal appeal, a state can confer such a right
upon its own terms.17 Although the due process clause protects against unfair
deprivations of liberty by the government," Justice Rehnquist determined
that Lucey was not deprived of liberty as a result of having his appeal
dismissed. Instead, he concluded that Lucey was deprived of liberty through
a lawful trial and conviction, in which the defendant apparently received
effective assistance of counsel. "9 Thus, the due process clause could not serve
as a basis for challenging the conviction.
ANALYSIS
In Lucey, the United States Supreme Court clarified the ambiguity caused
by the Griffin-Douglas line of cases concerning the extent of an appellant's
83. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974)).
84. Id. at 843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600,
611 (1974)). As a result, Justice Rehnquist determined that the right to effective assistance of
counsel applies only to trial level proceedings and is inapplicable to the appellate level issue in
Lucey.
86. Id. at 841 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974)
(opinion of Rehnquist, J.). In Arnett, Justice Rehnquist stated his preferred analysis of
procedural due process violations: "[Wlhere the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining
that right, . . . a litigant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter with the sweet."
Id.
88. 105 S. Ct. at 841 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (due process clause expressly applies to
deprivations of liberty).
89. Id. at 843-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also faulted the majority
decision from a policy standpoint. He predicted that the Lucey decision would produce a flood
of federal habeas corpus petitions that would charge ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
providing lawfully convicted criminals with another means to attack their convictions collaterally.
Justice Rehnquist was also concerned about the effect that the decision would have on the
integrity of state rules of procedure. He argued that allowing ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claims would enable defendants to circumvent state rules of appellate procedure because
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right to counsel on appeal. The Court determined that a criminal appellant's
rights are defined independently by the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.9 The Lucey decision must be analyzed
in two respects. First, whether the Court's interpretation that Griffin and
Douglas involved both due process and equal protection concerns was valid.
Second, whether the Court justifiably utilized sixth amendment cases, which
involve the trial level right to effective counsel, to decide an appellate level
issue that was based solely on the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause.
Griffin and Douglas certainly addressed equal protection concerns. 9 Be-
cause both Griffin and Douglas involved indigents, the Court's concern
focused on the disparity of treatment afforded two different classes of
appellants, the rich and the poor. This wealth-based distinction in the court's
procedures implied an equal protection analysis.2 The equal protection
analysis, however, does not preclude a separate due process analysis. Each
clause implicates different interests.93 The due process clause supports a
persons right to be treated fairly by the government when the government
seeks to deprive a person of a legal right; the equal protection clause requires
that the government not make irrational classifications among persons when
it distributes rights or imposes penalties. 94 Irrational classifications that
deprive people of legal rights conceivably affect both clauses.
The Court has frequently observed that the Griffin and Douglas cases
missing a reasonable filing deadline could be easily remedied by blaming counsel's incompetence.
Id. at 844 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 841 (both due process and equal protection concerns were implicated in Griffin
and Douglas cases).
91. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956), the Court stated: "There can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate [an] appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts."
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963), the Court stated: "There is lacking
that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of
right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and
marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent . . . is forced to shift for himself."
The Lucey Court also recognized the equal protection concerns in Griffin and Douglas when
it observed that those cases stood for the proposition that a "[s]tate could not . . . make [an
appeal] available only to the wealthy [becausel [sluch a disposition violate[s] equal protection
principles." Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 840.
Some commentators have also viewed these cases as primarily involving equal protection
analysis. See, e.g., Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 147 (1957) (Griffin decision
rests primarily on the equal protection clause); Note, Cost and Judicial Management Consid-
erations in the Right to Counsel for Indigents' Discretionary Appeals-Ross v. Moffit, 24
DE PAUL L. REV. 813, 817 (1975); Comment, Right to Counsel in Criminal Post-Conviction
Review Proceedings, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 970 (1963); 49 A.B.A. J. 588 (1963).
92. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974).
93. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 841 ("each Clause triggers a distinct inquiry").
94. Id.; see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (analyzing state statute that
provided alternative sentences of incarceration or restitution); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600,
610-1 I (1974) (analyzing right to counsel on discretionary appeals).
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involved due process issues. 95 Justice Black, in a plurality opinion in Griffin,
stated "that our .. . constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection both call for procedures ...which allow no invidious discrimi-
nation." ' 96 In Douglas, Justice Douglas wrote that when an indigent is forced
to make a preliminary showing of merit before appointment of counsel is
made, "the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure." 97 Justice
Harlan, in a dissenting opinion in Douglas, found that only due process was
implicated because "the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the
States an 'affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in
economic circumstances."' 8 Even Justice Rehnquist recognized the due proc-
ess content of Douglas and Griffin in his opinion for the Court in Ross v.
Moffit." In Ross, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the precise rationale for
the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitely stated, some
support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.""'
Therefore, the Lucey Court's interpretation of the Griffin-Douglas line of
cases is not only justified, but also conforms to relevant precedent.
Because the Lucey decision was based solely on the due process clause,
subsequent claims that involve an appellate level assistance of counsel issue
will also probably be decided by due process analysis. The due process
analysis bypasses the problem posed by the equal protection clause of having
to remedy economic differences among criminal appellants. An equal pro-
tection analysis would probably require the government to raise the quality
of counsel for indigent criminal appellants to some minimally acceptable
level. However, the government would not have to provide indigents with
counsel equal in quality to counsel retained by nonindigents. "'
95. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983) ("Due process and equal protection
principles converge in the Court's analysis [in the Griffin-Douglas line of cases]").
Commentators have also recognized the dual nature of the Griffin-Douglas line of cases.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 105, 107 (1963) (criminal
appellant's right to counsel ambiguously stated as a "fourteenth amendment" right); 8 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 125, 129 (1963) ("indivisible mixture of equal protection and due process lan-
guage' '); Note, Criminal Procedure-Due Process and Equal Protection Held to Require Free
Transcripis for Indigent Convicts, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 501; Note, Constitutional Law: Due Process
and Equal Protection: Right of an Indigent Defendant to a Transcript of the Trial, 4 UCLA
L. REV. 274 (1956); Comment, Constitutional Law-Post-Conviction Due Process-Right of
Indigent to Review of Non-Constitutional Trial Errors, 55 MICH. L. REv. 413, 414 (1957)
(Griffin is based upon an almost indistinguishable combination of due process and equal
protection).
96. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 1, 17 (1956). Justice Black also stated that "equal protection
and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system"-that all- people
charged with a crime should stand equally before the law. Id.
97. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
98. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
100. Id. at 608-09.
101. For example, a state may be required to appoint effective counsel to an indigent, but
can never actually put the poor man on the same level as a rich man who may be able to
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Instead, when the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal is at
issue, the equal protection clause should be considered as stibordinate to the
due process clause.102 A violation of the equal protection clause in this
context should be treated as a per se violation of the due process clause. If
a state fails to provide an indigent appellant with a minimally acceptable
level of representation, then it violates the fairness guarantee inherent in the
due process clause. In other words, the government does not satisfy due
process when it allows indigent appellants to suffer ineffective assistance of
counsel while wealthier appellants who are otherwise similarly situated can
obtain and benefit from competent professional assistance. The failure to
provide individuals with equal access to criminal appeals, therefore, violates
the fundamental fairness guarantee of due process.
When the Lucey Court found a due process right to effective assistance
of counsel on appeal, it also reviewed the line of cases that discussed the
trial level right to counsel. The Court found that, because the roles of
counsel are similar at the trial and appellate level, the right to effective
assistance of counsel is constitutionally mandated at both levels."'3 The
Court's analysis in this respect is consistent with the two policies that underlie
the right to effective assistance of counsel. The first policy is that criminal
defendants must, in fairness, be given the resources to confront government
prosecutors."' The second policy is that a defendant who lacks familiarity
with procedural and substantive law will be denied an effective hearing
without the effective assistance of counsel.'0
afford retention of the best legal talent available. The fourteenth amendment "does not require
absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)
(quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973)). See also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Douglas, Justice
Harlan rejected the equal protection analysis based on wealth-based classifications:
States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from discriminating
between the "rich" and "poor" as such in the formulation and application of their
laws. But it is a far different thing to suggest that this provision prevents the State
from adopting a law of general applicability that may affect the poor more harshly
than it does the rich, or, on the other hand, from making some effort to redress
economic imbalances while not eliminating them entirely.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102. See Comment, supra note 4, at 759 (Griffin and Douglas both implied that due process
incorporates a basic notion of equality).
103. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. Numerous Supreme Court cases have
stated that the 'trial level right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel.
See United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Reece v. Georgia,
350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). But see Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982) ("Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a
competent attorney").
104. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (ordinary criminal defendants do
not have professional legal skills to protect themselves in a trial setting, while state is represented
by experienced counsel).
105. See Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 835 (defendant's liberty depends upon defendant's ability to
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At the appellate level, criminal appellants face the same problems en-
countered at trial. On appeal, as at trial, the states' lawyers muster the best
arguments available to defeat criminal appeals. Furthermore, criminal ap-
pellants are as unfamiliar with law and procedure on appeal as they are at
trial. The underlying rationale for the criminal defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel, therefore, applies to both the appellate and trial levels.
This is true regardless of whether the right emanates from the sixth amend-
ment or the due process clause. Thus, the majority's reliance on the right
to counsel at trial to construct a similar appellate level right is justified.
The Lucey Court also addressed certain practical considerations in its
decision. The Court noted that nominal but incompetent representation was
as bad as no representation at all.'16 The Court also indicated that the
promise of Douglas-that a criminal appellant has a right to counsel on
appeal-would "be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to the
effective assistance of counsel."" 7 Thus, in finding the existence of an
appellate level right to the effective assistance of counsel, the Lucey Court
merely extended Douglas to its logical conclusion.
The right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal had become widely
established even before the Lucey decision. Many courts, both federal
0 8
and state,1°9 had already recognized a criminal appellanil's right to the
present case according to legal rules and against a trained advocate); see also Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("lawyers in criminal courts are necessities not luxuries").
106. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 836 (appellant whose counsel does not provide effective represen-
tation is in no better position than appellant with no counsel). The Lucey Court found it
difficult to distinguish Lucey's situation from that of someone who had no counsel at all
because "counsel's failure was particularly egregious in that it essentially waived Lucey's
opportunity to make a case on the merits." Id. at 835 n.6.
107. Id. at 836.
108. See, e.g., Francois v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1275, 1284-85 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Tsirizotakis
v. LeFevre, 736 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 216 (1984); Branch v. Cvpp,
736 F.2d 533, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1984); Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1291 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 355 (1984); Cunningham v. Henderson, 725 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984);
Doyle v. United States, 721 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1983); Gilbert v. Sowders, 646 F.2d 1146 (6th
Cir. 1981); Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F.2d 596, 598 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing cases), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982); Robinson v. Wyrick, 635 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1981); Cleaver v.
Bordenkircher, 634 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); Miller v.
McCarthy, 607 F.2d 854, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1979); Passmore v. Estelae, 594 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); Cantrell v. Alabama, 546 F.2d 652, 653 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977); Waiters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 990 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973); Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 949-50 (7th Cir. 1972).
109. See, e.g., Harkness v. State, 264 Ark. 561, 572 S.W.2d 835 (1978) (per curiam); People
v. Barton, 21 Cal. 3d 513, 579 P.2d 1043, 146 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1978); Erb v. State, 332 A.2d
137 (Del. 1974); Hines v. United States, 237 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1968); Barclay v. Wainwright,
444 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1984); McAuliffe v. Rutledge, 231 Ga. 745, 204 S.E.2d 141 (1974); State
v. Erwin, 57 Hawaii 268, 554 P.2d 236 (1976); People v. Brown, 39 I1. 2d 307, 235 N.E.2d
562 (1968); Burton v. State, 455 N.E.2d 938 (Ind. 1983); Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 669-
71, 399 A.2d 256, 258-260 (1979); Irving v. State, 441 So. 2d 846, 856 (Miss. 1983); People v.
Gonzalez, 47 N.Y.2d 606, 393 N.E.2d 987 (1979); Shipman v. Gladden, 253 Or. 192, 453 P.2d
921 (1969); Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 416 A.2d 477 (1980); Grooms v. State,
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effective assistance of counsel on a first appeal of right. The majority in
Lucey found that the Supreme Court had already implied that the right to
counsel on appeal requires the effective assistance of counsel. The majority
-cited Griffin as "affording adequate and effective" appellate review to
indigent defendants."10 Additionally, in Anders v. California,"' the Court
held that appointed counsel who believed that a defendant's appeal was
without merit must nevertheless provide assistance to the appellant by filing
a brief that refers to anything that might arguably support the appeal." 2 In
Entsminger v. Iowa,' 3 the Court also reversed a conviction because the
appellate counsel failed to assist his client in perfecting an appeal." 4 Thus,
the Lucey Court viewed Anders and Entsminger as resting on the premise
"that a State must supply indigent criminal appellants with attorneys who
can provide specified types of assistance-that is, that such appellants have
a right to effective assistance of counsel."'' 5
Finally, the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal was also
implicitly recognized in Jones v. Barnes."6 In Jones, the appellant's counsel
failed to incorporate many of the appellant's suggestions in the appellate
brief and oral argument. The defendant challenged his conviction on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Jones Court held that the
appellate counsel's action did not amount to ineffective assistance of coun-
sel." 7 The Court's analysis of the propriety of the appellate counsel's as-
sistance, however, would have been superfluous if no appellate level right
to the effective assistance of counsel existed in the first place., 8 Thus, the
Lucey Court recognized explicitly what the Court had recognized indirectly
in its earlier decisions.
IMPACT
The Lucey decision will create some problems for the administration of
state criminal appeals. If a criminal appellant's attorney does not meet a
critical filing deadline, the appellate court will be unable to dismiss the
appeal without further investigation into the reason for the delay. Conse-
quently, every time a criminal appellate counsel misses a filing deadline, an
appellate court will have two possible choices. The court may convene a
hearing to determine whether the failure of counsel to meet the deadline was
a consequence of appellate counsel's incompetence. To avoid the time and
320 N.W.2d 149 (S.D. 1982); In re Savo, 139 Vt. 527, 431 A.2d 482 (1981); Rhodes v. Leverette,
160 W. Va. 781, 239 S.E.2d 136 (1977).
110. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 834 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 352 U.S. 1, 20 (1956)).
Ill. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
112. 386 U.S. at 744.
113. 386 U.S. 748 (1967). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
114. 386 U.S. at 752.
115. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 840.
116. 463 U.S. 745 (1983). See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 836 n.8.
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expense of an additional hearing, an appellate court could also automatically
accept late filings. The first alternative would cause greater delays in proc-
essing appeals, while the second would effectively nullify state rules of
appellate procedure :hat contain time limits.
When an attorney's incompetence results in an appellant's failure to meet
a filing deadline, the state appellate court must determine how much addi-
tional time to allow to cure the defect. For a defendant whose sentence has
been stayed pending appeal, the Lucey decision provides an additional means
by which the consequences of a conviction can be delayed. Moreover,
successive attorney incompetence would likely lengthen what might already
be a substantial delay. Therefore, for the sake of finality, some maximum
time limit will undoubtedly be established beyond which an appellant will
be rebuttably presumed to have knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to a further appeal.
These complications are minimal, however, when compared with the ben-
efits of the Lucey decision. To allow an innocent person to remain in jail
due to his attorney's incompetence in handling an appeal is clearly unjust.
The protection of individual liberty should not be sacrificed when the
countervailing administrative burdens on the state are so minimal. Moreover,
the impact of Lucey on the adherence to state rules of procedure will be
relatively slight. There is no incentive for an attorney to disregard state
procedural rules and time limits because the attorney still remains subject to
disciplinary action under the codes of ethics." 9 Thus, missed deadlines should
remain the exception rather than the rule. Morever, a state may provide
flexible procedural rules that permit a post-conviction attack on the trial
judgment as a means of remedying a frustrated right of appeal caused by
incompetent appellate counsel. 20
As the dissent noted, the Lucey decision creates another means for persons
convicted of crimes to collaterally attack their convictions.' 2' However,
Justice Rehnquist overstates the problem by predicting a flood of habeas
corpus petitions that claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. The
burden of proof will be on the defendant to show the incompetence of
appellate counsel. Furthermore, the professional judgment of appellate coun-
sel will be given deference. For example, according to Jones v. Barnes,
appellate counsel need not raise every nonfrivolous argument available to
their clients on appeal.'22 When a decision on the merits has been obtained
at the appellate level, most ineffective assistance of counsel claims will be
related to an attorney's exercise of professional judgment. Thus, these claims
will be disposed of quickly as a matter of law.
1
119. Failure to meet a filing deadline could subject an attorney to disciplinary proceedings
under the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 6-101: "A
lawyer shall not ... neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSmILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (4980).
120. See supra note 45 (statutory procedure in Kentucky).
121. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 844 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
122. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
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Correspondingly, the strongest ineffective assistance of counsel claims will
likely involve situations in which an attorney's incompetence prevents a
criminal appellant from obtaining an actual review on the merits. In states
that have recognized a criminal defendant's right to the effective assistance
of counsel, courts have found that an attorney's failure to obtain an appellate
review on the merits constitutes ineffective assistance. 2" These states have
upheld ineffective assistance of counsel claims when an attorney has failed
to file an appeal,' 24 has failed to timely perfect an appeal, 25 has failed to
obtain an adequate record for appellate review,' 26 has failed to file a brief,'27
or has filed a wholly deficient brief.'2 These situations are not unlike Lucey,
in which the Court strongly implied that appellate counsel's failure to procure
a decision on the merits will automatically constitute a denial of the effective
assistance of counsel. 29 Thus, in light of Lucey, attorneys that handle appeals
for indigent appellants will have a plain understanding of what is constitu-
tionally required.
After Lucey, the right to effective assistance of counsel exists only on a
first appeal as of right.' 30 In the years since Powell v. Alabama, however,
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel has expanded to
123. See infra notes 124-28.
124. See Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 299-300, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (1980)
(counsel could be deemed ineffective for failing to file an appeal even if there was no issue of
arguable merit).
125. State v. Erwin, 57 Hawaii 268, 270, 554 P.2d 236, 238 (1976) (indigent criminal defendant
is entitled, on a first appeal of right, to court appointed counsel who may not deprive defendant
of right to appeal by ignoring procedural rules); Shipman v. Gladden, 253 Or. 192, 199, 453
P.2d 921, 925 (1969) (retained counsel's failure to file a timely notice of appeal is incompetence
as a matter of law and a denial of due process); Rhodes v. Leverette, 160 W. Va. 781, 786,
239 S.E.2d 136, 140 (1977) (failure of counsel to perfect appeal within appeal period allowed
after resentencing).
126. People v. Barton, 21 Cal. 3d 513, 519-20, 579 P.2d 1043, 1047, 146 Cal. Rptr. 727,
731 (1978) (failure of counsel to include a transcript of a motion to suppress as part of the
record for appellate review constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); McAuliffe
v. Rutledge, 231 Ga. 745, 746, 204 S.E.2d 141, 142 (1974) (failure to obtain a timely extension
of time for filing the transcript of a lower court proceeding is ineffective assistance of counsel).
127. People v. Brown, 39 I1. 2d 307, 235 N.E.2d 562 (1968) (claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel upheld where appellate counsel filed a timely notice of appeal and nothing thereafter).
128. People v. Gonzalez, 47 N.Y.2d 606, 610, 393 N.E.2d 987, 990 (1979). In Gonzalez,
counsel's brief consisted of a summary of each witness's testimony and four point headings
with no discussion or argument of any sort under any point. Id. at 608, 393 N.E.2d at 988-89.
See also Burton v. State, 455 N.E.2d 938, 939-40 (Ind. 1983) (defendant received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel when counsel's brief waived substantive legal issues without
appellant's consent).
129. Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). In Harris, the court cited Lucey
as authority for the proposition that, "by any measure, counsel's failure to perfect an appeal
must be considered ineffective assistance." Id. at 993.
130. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 836 n.7. The Court in Ross distinguished Douglas because "the
opportunity to have counsel prepare an initial brief in the Court of Appeals and the nature of
[a] discretionary review ... make ... [the lack of counsel a] handicap far less than the
handicap borne by the indigent defendant on his initial appeal as of right in Douglas. " Ross
v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
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cover all criminal defendants and appellants as of right. The next logical
step, therefore, would be to find a right to effective assistance of counsel
on discretionary appeals. Although the Court held in Wainwright v. Torna, ''
a 1982 per curiam opinion, that the sixth amendment guaranteed no right
to effective. assistance of counsel on discretionary appeals, the opinion leaves
open the possibility that an attorney who conducts a discretionary appeal
negligently may infringe a defendant's right to due process."'
Through its observation that the roles of counsel at trial are similar to
those on appeal, the Lucey Court cast aside technical distinctions between
trial and appellate advocacy. A basic concept of fairness has been used to
determine the reach of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'" The
basic fairness considerations that underlie the right to the effective assistance
of counsel-that counsel is necessary to combat the government's hired
prosecutors and to protect criminal defendants from their own ignorance of
law and procedure-apply equally at the trial level, at a first appeal of right,
and at the discretionary appellate level." Consequently, fairness requires
that the right to effective assistance of counsel also be extended to discre-
tionary appeals.
Moreover, to extend the right to effective assistance of counsel to discre-
tionary appeals would not create overly burdensome administrative problems.
When retained counsel is involved, the denial of writ of certiorari or leave
of appeal through an attorney's failure to meet technical requirements is as
invidious a result as the dismissal of a direct appeal. In both situations,
defendants are denied hearings not because of their own mistakes, but
because of their attorneys' incompetence.
When an indigent defendant is involved, it is common practice to appoint
counsel upon the granting of a discretionary appeal.' Therefore, the exten-
131. 455 U.S. 586 (1982).
132. Id. at 589 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued in dissent that even "if
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel may not have been
infringed, he was denied the rights to due process." Id. Marshall argued that for a defendant
to lose the right to seek a discretionary appeal was fundamentally unfair, and that there was
sufficient state action in some cases to warrant court review for due process violations. Id. at
589-90 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)).
133. 455 U.S. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Douglas v. California was grounded on
concepts of fairness and equality").
134. See Wainwright v. Torna, 445 U.S. 586, 588 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (when
defendant seeks discretionary review, assistance of counsel is vital); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S.
600, 620-21 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[ain indigent defendant is as much in need of
the assistance of a lawyer in preparing and filing a petition for certiorari as he is in the handling
of an appeal of right"). See also Justice Harlan's dissent in Douglas where he stated:
Nor can it well be suggested that having appointed counsel is more necessary to
the fair administration of justice in an initial appeal . . . of right . . . which the
reviewing court on the full record has already determined to be frivolous, than in
a petition asking [for] a higher appellate court to exercise its discretion to consider
what may be a substantial constitutional claim.
372 U.S. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Under the practice of ... [the
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sion of the right to effective assistance of counsel to discretionary appeals
will, in most cases, require only the appointment of additional counsel for
the purpose of preparing a memoranda to support an application for a
discretionary appeal. The appointed counsel who handled the first appeal of
right will be familiar with the facts and legal issues involved, so that "[it]
would be a relatively easy matter for the attorney to apply his expertise in
filing the writ of certiorari to a higher court."' 36
Because effective assistance of counsel is a basic necessity in judicial
procedings,"' states must assume the risk of frivolous claims rather than
allow a potentially innocent person to stand convicted for lack of counsel
after conviction.' There are few functions of the court more important
than providing an individual charged with a crime full process before de-
priving him of his liberty.3 9 Any resulting increase in expenditures will be
well spent, as the methods employed "in the enforcement of our criminal
law have aptly been called the measures by which the quality of our civili-
zation will be judged."' 40
CONCLUSION
In Evitts v. Lucey, the Supreme Court held that a criminal appellant has
a right to the effective assistance of counsel in a first appeal of right. The
Court based its decision on the due process clause by interpreting past cases
that involved the rights of criminal appellants to express equal protection as
well as due process concerns. The Court also considered the policies that
underlie the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Because criminal
appellants must combat the intracacies of the law and the advocacy of the
public prosecutor, the Court found that the right to the effective assistance
of counsel is necessary to pr6tect criminal appellants' liberty interests. These
policies, however, apply equally to discretionary appeals. The right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel, therefore, should be further extended to discre-
tionary appeals.
As a result of Lucey, criminal defendants will no longer be unfairly
prejudiced by their appellate counsels' failure to meet filing deadlines. Lu-
cey's impact on the integrity of state rules of appellate procedure will be
minimal, because ethical codes already provide a means to discipline attorneys
Supreme Court], only if it appears from the petition for certiorari that a case merits review is
leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted .. .and counsel appointed").
136. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 621 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
137. See Lucey, 105 S. Ct. at 835 ("Gideon rested on the obvious truth that lawyers are
necessities not luxuries for our adversarial system of justice").
138. Day, Coming: The Right to Have Assistance of Counsel at All Appellate Stages, 52
A.B.A. J. 135 (1966). See also United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045 (1984); Herring
v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (premise of adversarial system of criminal justice is
that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case promotes accurate judgments of guilt and
innocence).
139. Day, supra note 138, at 138.
140. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
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who fail to comply with state rules. Moreover, any administrative burdens
caused by the Lucey decision are far outweighed by the reduced possibility
that an innocent person will remain unjustly convicted.
John Donahue
